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DISABLED, DEFENSELESS, AND STILL DEPORTABLE:  WHY 
DEPORTATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION UNDERMINES 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED IMMIGRANTS 
Helen Eisner  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Xiu Ping Jiang, a Chinese immigrant with a history of attempted 
suicide, sat through her immigration hearing silently with her “arms 
folded, [and] her eyes downcast.”1  Without a court-appointed lawyer, 
and without the mental wherewithal to communicate with the immi-
gration judge, she was treated by the court as if she had failed to ap-
pear.2 
Jose Fernandez Sanchez, a forty-five-year-old Mexican immigrant 
who suffers from schizophrenia, was so catatonic during an immigra-
tion proceeding that he was unable to answer the immigration 
judge’s most basic questions.3  Nonetheless, Fernandez Sanchez was 
expected to represent himself in his deportation hearing.4 
The experiences of Jiang and Fernandez Sanchez are not unique.  
Their stories illustrate the obstacles facing mentally disabled immi-
grants when they are unable to afford an attorney.  Under the Sixth 
Amendment, mentally disabled criminal defendants receive vigorous 
protections, including the right to counsel.5  In contrast, there is no 
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 1 Nina Bernstein, Mentally Ill and in Immigration Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at A21. 
 2 Id. at A17. 
 3 See Emily Ramshaw, Mentally Ill Immigrants Have Little Hope for Care When Detained, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/
tools/MHI/library/Emily%20Ramshaw,%20The%20Dallas%20Morning%20News,%20Ju
ly%2013,%202009.pdf (describing the hurdles facing mentally ill immigrants, such as 
Fernandez Sanchez, who are not afforded the right to counsel). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); see also Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 
(1954) (“We have not allowed convictions to stand if the accused stood trial without ben-
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comparable right to court-appointed counsel for noncitizens during 
immigration hearings, even when an immigrant’s mental impair-
ments render him delusional, unable to understand the conse-
quences of his hearing, or incapable of presenting arguments in his 
favor.6 
In December 2010, a federal judge in the Central District of Cali-
fornia held that to receive a fair hearing, two immigrants with mental 
disabilities should be provided with counsel.7  This decision, the first 
to recognize a right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants, un-
derscores the need for further clarity about the rights of this vulnera-
ble population. 
This Comment examines the barriers confronting mentally dis-
abled immigrants who struggle to represent themselves in the immi-
gration system without the right to counsel and argues that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel 
for these detainees.  While the law does not currently recognize a 
right to counsel for immigrants in immigration hearings, detainees 
are entitled to protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.8  Additionally, the law recognizes that both criminal 
and immigration sanctions have the potential to curtail personal li-
 
efit of counsel and yet was so unskilled, so ignorant, or so mentally deficient as not to be 
able to comprehend the legal issues involved in his defense.”). 
 6 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT:  MENTAL DISABILITY, UNFAIR 
HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 46, 53–56 (2010), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/usdeportation0710_0.pdf (documenting 
cases where noncitizens with mental disabilities represented themselves in immigration 
court). 
 7 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  In this class ac-
tion suit, the judge held that a reasonable accommodation for detainees with mental dis-
abilities included the appointment of counsel.  Id.  When asked if he understood what 
was happening after waiving his right to appeal his removal, one claimant in the case, 
who was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, stated to the immigration 
judge, “Yes.  But I don’t understand anything now.”  Id. at 1041.  Although the detainees 
raised due process claims, the judge did not address these claims and instead relied on 
the need to comply with regulatory requirements to reasonably accommodate incompe-
tent aliens.  Id. at 1055.  See First Amended Complaint at 30, Franco-Gonzalez, 767 F. Supp. 
2d 1034 (No. 10-CV-02211) (arguing on behalf of the claimants that “the [U.S.] Constitu-
tion requires the Government to (1) conduct competency evaluations for all those who 
the Government knows or should know may be incompetent to represent themselves, 
[and] (2) appoint attorneys for those found to be in need of counsel”). 
 8 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (“But once an alien lawfully enters and 
resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion to all people within our borders.  Such rights include those protected by the First 
and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”); see also Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101 
(1903) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires that aliens receive a fair hearing 
before they are deported). 
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berty and impose similar hardships on individuals.9  While mentally 
disabled immigrants do have the right to a fair hearing, those who 
find themselves responsible for their own defense may lack the capac-
ity to recognize the significance of their proceedings.  The complexi-
ties of presenting a case and asserting a claim for asylum or withhold-
ing of removal will likely be impossible for a mentally disabled 
detainee to grasp.10  Therefore, the immigration system’s current 
standard of denying a right to counsel for mentally disabled detainees 
jeopardizes constitutional due process and unfairly deprives those 
most in need of the protections of a fair hearing. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the prevalence of mental disabil-
ities within the immigrant detainee population and explains the im-
portance of legal representation for avoiding deportation.  Part III 
argues that the current system of self-representation violates the Fifth 
Amendment due process rights of mentally disabled immigrants.  A 
necessary context for this argument is the vigorous protections that 
exist in the criminal justice system to determine a criminal defen-
dant’s competency to stand trial and capacity to represent himself.  
The immigration court could use the criminal justice system as a 
model if it were to adopt a right to counsel.  Next, Part III details the 
constitutional protections currently afforded to immigrants and con-
tends that a system of default self-representation by the mentally dis-
abled undermines fundamental fairness.  This Part further defines 
what process is due by balancing the individual and governmental in-
terests, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights.  Part IV draws 
from federal regulations, agency actions, and human rights laws to 
present policy arguments that favor recognition of a right to counsel.  
Part V concludes by recommending reforms to federal law and the 
immigration court and detention system to protect immigrant due 
process rights. 
 
 9 See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147 (emphasizing that although the denial of asylum is not a crim-
inal penalty, it still imposes a great hardship). 
 10 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET:  ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL 
RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE PROTECTIONS (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf (describ-
ing the process for asserting a claim for asylum and for asserting a claim for withholding 
of removal). 
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II.  THE PREVALENCE OF MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE IMPORTANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
Mental disabilities pervade the detainee population.11  These dis-
abilities place immigrants at a distinct disadvantage when they at-
tempt to present a case for asylum or withholding of removal, and 
their prevalence highlights the need to enact safeguards that address 
the current deficiencies of the immigration court system. 
A.  The Incidence of Mental Disability in Immigration Detention 
The immigration detention network is vast.  In fiscal year 2009, 
U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained be-
tween 380,000 and 442,000 immigrants.12  Detained immigrants in-
clude individuals who entered the United States without authoriza-
tion, individuals seeking asylum, and U.S. permanent resident aliens 
facing criminal charges.13  To determine whether noncitizens will be 
deported or receive a grant of asylum, detainees attend hearings in 
immigration court.14  The immigration court system is overseen by the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), a division of the 
Department of Justice.15  Since immigration courts are notoriously 
overburdened, immigration judges resolve the influx of cases by de-
ciding an average of four cases each day.16  In 2008, individual immi-
 
 11 For the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “mental disability” will refer to mental, 
behavioral, and emotional conditions, and intellectual disabilities that undermine an in-
dividual’s ability to prepare a case and represent himself during a court proceeding.  This 
analysis excludes mental disabilities such as anxiety disorders that do not implicate an in-
dividual’s capacity to understand the charges against him and fairly represent himself.  If 
Congress adopts a right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants, regulations can pro-
vide guidance to immigration judges charged with making capacity determinations.  See 
infra Part II.A for a discussion of the widespread presence of mental disability in immigra-
tion detention. 
 12 TEXAS APPLESEED, JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRATION’S HIDDEN POPULATION:  PROTECTING THE 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT AND 
DETENTION SYSTEM 9 (2010), available at http://www.texasappleseed.net/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=313. 
 13 Id. at 10. 
 14 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 3 (describing the crimes for which an alleged 
violator, who could be mentally disabled, may be brought into immigration court). 
 15 See generally Executive Office for Immigration Review:  About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last updated Sept. 2010) (providing back-
ground information about the EOIR, its creation, and its organization). 
 16 See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that in fiscal year 2009, it was estimated 
that each immigration judge had to decide four cases per business day); see also AM. BAR 
ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM:  PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, 
FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES ES-
19 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
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gration judges issued an average of 1014 decisions a piece.  By con-
trast, Veterans law judges issued on average 729 decisions and Social 
Security Administration law judges decided an average of 544 cases.17  
For immigration judges, the difficulties of rendering decisions are 
exacerbated by the absence of administrative support staff—there is 
on average one law clerk for every four immigration judges.18  There-
fore, immigration judges must balance the competing pressures of 
rising caseloads and limited resources. 
Mental health disabilities are widespread among the detainee 
population.  Neither ICE nor the EOIR keeps comprehensive records 
about immigrant mental health, but ICE estimates from 2008 suggest 
that between 7571 and 18,929 detainees suffered from a “serious 
mental illness” and that between 38,000 and 60,000 detainees had 
some contact with the immigrant mental health system.19  Additional-
ly, the international advocacy group Human Rights Watch estimates 
that 57,000 detainees have a mental disability.20  The widespread use 
of psychotropic medicine within ICE detention facilities further high-
lights the prevalence of mental disability among the detainee popula-
tion.21 
When immigrants are first brought into detention, ICE requires 
that detainees receive an initial medical and mental health screen-
ing.22  However, overcrowding strains ICE staff and often impedes 
recognition of detainees’ mental health disabilities.23  In one Massa-
chusetts study, overcrowding in ICE facilities created backlogs of sev-
eral weeks before medical staff addressed detainees’ health com-
plaints.24  While ICE has standards in place for treating immigrants, 
 
media/nosearch/immigration_reform_executive_summary_012510.authcheckdam.pdf 
(explaining that between fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 2008, there was a 23% increase in 
the number of cases commenced in immigration court to expel noncitizens). 
 17 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 16, at ES-28. 
 18 Id. 
 19 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 17. 
 20 Id. at 3. 
 21 See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 12 (explaining that between January 1, 2005 and 
June 1, 2009, 14,859 detained immigrants received prescriptions for an average of more 
than five psychotropic drugs). 
 22 See Lisa A. Cahan, Constitutional Protections of Aliens:  A Call for Action to Provide Adequate 
Health Care for Immigration Detainees, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 343, 350 (2007) (criti-
cizing immigrants’ inadequate access to health care). 
 23 See id. at 348 n.21 (explaining how overcrowding at facilities undermines the timeliness 
and availability of care). 
 24 See ACLU OF MASS., DETENTION IN THE AGE OF ICE:  IMMIGRANTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 49 (2008), available at http://www.aclum.org/ice/documents/
aclu_ice_detention_report.pdf (detailing the impact of overcrowding on immigrants who 
are held in detention facilities in Massachusetts). 
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these standards are not regulations and do not provide concrete re-
quirements for ICE employees.25  Given this backdrop, mentally dis-
abled immigrants confront a system that is unable to recognize indi-
vidual vulnerabilities and provide the support necessary to ensure fair 
representation. 
B.  Detainee Self-Representation 
In immigration court, access to counsel can be the single factor 
that determines the success or failure of an asylum claim.  Immi-
grants have the right to be represented by an attorney in immigration 
court but do not have the right to a government-funded attorney.26  
Thus, mentally disabled immigrants with limited resources face a 
high likelihood of deportation. 
Given that most immigrants come from indigent backgrounds, 
hiring a lawyer is often infeasible.27  As a result, 61% of immigrants 
represent themselves in immigration court.28  This statistic includes 
both detained and non-detained immigrants.  For detained immi-
grants, the incidence of self-representation grows precipitously, as 
approximately 84% of detained immigrants do not have representa-
tion during removal proceedings.29  In some Texas detention facili-
ties, 97% of immigrants lack representation during hearings.30 
Self-representation puts immigrants at a significant disadvantage.  
Most detainees are unfamiliar with court procedures and do not have 
training in immigration law.  Asylum seekers who have legal repre-
sentation are four to six times more likely to receive asylum than un-
 
 25 See Detention and Removal:  Immigration Detainee Medical Care:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 56–60 (2007), (statement of Tom Jawetz, ACLU Nat’l Prison Project, Presen-
tation on Medical Care and Deaths in ICE Custody). 
 26 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(b)(4)(A) (2006) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being 
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is 
authorized to practice in such proceedings . . . .”). 
 27 See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation:  
Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 548 (2009) (explain-
ing that foreign-born immigrants, who often come from underprivileged communities, 
rarely have the financial means to hire counsel). 
 28 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 5. 
 29 See AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE:  IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 30 
(2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (de-
scribing the barriers immigration detainees face in obtaining counsel). 
 30 See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 13. 
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represented detainees.31  Studies suggest that individuals who proceed 
pro se are simply unaware of defenses that would result in successful 
asylum claims.32  Self-represented immigrants face the additional bur-
den of having to confront experienced government attorneys on the 
opposing side.33  This combination of obstacles means that individuals 
who are not represented by counsel experience a heightened risk of 
deportation.  Beyond a lack of representation, insufficient access to 
information about the charges against them and language barriers 
also contribute to adverse outcomes for immigrants who proceed 
without an attorney.34 
Mental disability exacerbates the burdens already facing detainees 
during court proceedings.  Even a mentally sound immigrant without 
legal training would have trouble grasping the complexities of an asy-
lum defense.  The challenge is that much greater for a detainee with 
mental disabilities who lacks the capacity to understand the charges 
against him, let alone present a coherent case for asylum.35  Without 
representation, these immigrants have little hope of avoiding depor-
tation. 
III.  DUE PROCESS DEPRIVATIONS WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
FOR MENTALLY DISABLED IMMIGRANTS 
The right to fairly present a case is a critical component of consti-
tutional due process.  Yet, mentally disabled immigrants are at a dis-
tinct disadvantage. Their disability prevents effective self-
representation, and thus, mandatory self-representation conflicts with 
immigrants’ due process rights.  This Part argues that immigrant due 
process rights should include the right to counsel for mentally dis-
abled immigrants.  It first describes the framework of constitutional 
protections for immigrants and compares these protections with 
those afforded to criminal defendants.  Next, it shows how the cur-
 
 31 See Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation:  Ideas for 
Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 740 (2002) (discussing asylum seekers’ lack of access to 
legal representation). 
 32 See Michael J. Churgin, An Essay on Legal Representation of Non-Citizens in Detention, 5 
INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 167, 171 (2010) (citing a study of New York de-
tainees that found “that few detainees had any knowledge of possible defenses to removal, 
while almost 40% had colorable claims as determined by the project attorneys”). 
 33 See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 5. 
 34 See Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 31, at 751–52 (discussing efforts to provide asylum 
seekers with information in multiple languages about their rights). 
 35 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 40 (describing a mentally ill man who told the 
judge “just deport me” believing that deportation meant he would be able to leave deten-
tion, but not that he would be sent out of the country). 
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rent system of self-representation by the mentally disabled implicates 
fundamental fairness concerns and undermines immigrant due 
process.  This Part concludes by analyzing what process should be 
due to mentally disabled immigrants. 
A.  Immigrant Constitutional Protections 
In contrast to the criminal justice system, immigration proceed-
ings are classified as civil in nature.36  The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees that the accused in criminal proceedings has the right “to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”37  Yet, Sixth Amendment 
protections are often confined to the criminal justice system.38  Thus, 
although a mentally disabled immigrant facing criminal charges 
would have a right to counsel, the same immigrant facing deporta-
tion would not because of the civil nature of the proceeding.39 
While there is no right to counsel for immigrants in deportation 
proceedings, detainees do receive substantial due process protections 
under the Fifth Amendment.40  In Yamataya v. Fisher, the Court rec-
 
 36 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a 
purely civil action . . . .”). 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 38 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (describing the track record of uncer-
tainty about the Sixth Amendment’s application outside of the criminal context); see also 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides a right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions). 
 39 A recent Supreme Court decision, Turner v. Rogers, introduces new due process considera-
tions for determining the rights of civil defendants who face the possibility of incarcera-
tion.  131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).  The defendant in Turner faced civil contempt charges for 
failure to pay child support.  Id. at 2513.  He challenged the constitutionality of the pro-
ceeding based on his denial of the right to counsel.  Id. at 2514.  Applying the Mathews v. 
Eldridge balancing test, the Court assessed whether denying him access to counsel was 
fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 2517.  For a discussion of this 
test, see infra Part III.E.  The Turner Court recognized that the private interest at stake—
the deprivation of liberty through imprisonment—argued “strongly for the right to coun-
sel.”  Id.  However, the Court found that “substitute procedural safeguards” used in civil 
contempt proceedings reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation and negated the consti-
tutional challenge.  Id. at 5219.  The case suggests that there is a right to counsel when a 
civil defendant faces a potential deprivation of liberty, and safeguards would not remedy 
fundamental fairness concerns.  The Court referenced protections in civil contempt pro-
ceedings including the use of forms to identify financial information, and an opportunity 
for the civil defendant to respond to statements about his financial status.  Id.  For a men-
tally disabled individual, the use of forms or the opportunity to respond to claims about 
immigration status would still present accuracy problems and would not reduce the like-
lihood of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.  Thus, the holding in Turner supports the 
right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants.  See infra Part III.B for a discussion of 
the potential deprivation of liberty that mentally disabled immigrants confront. 
 40 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (finding that due process protections ex-
tend to immigrants). 
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ognized that immigrants have protected liberty interests and that the 
Due Process Clause prevents these interests from being denied arbi-
trarily.41  Yamataya laid the foundation for extending constitutional 
protections to noncitizens.  The Court explained:  
[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, 
that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute in-
volving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles 
that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution.42 
Even in the context of burgeoning immigration to the United 
States, immigrant due process protections still remain forceful.43  In 
Woody v. INS, the Court again asserted that to protect immigrants’ 
rights, there must be “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” proof be-
fore a person can be deported.44  Federal regulations reinforce these 
legal protections and ensure that an immigrant receives “a reasonable 
opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him or 
her, to present evidence in his or her own behalf and to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the government.”45  Both federal 
courts and federal regulators have thus made clear that due process 
protections mandating a fair hearing apply equally to immigrant de-
tainees and criminal defendants. 
B.  Mental Health Protections in the Criminal Justice System 
The absence of a right to counsel in the immigration system con-
trasts with the due process rights afforded mentally disabled criminal 
defendants.  In the criminal system, individuals with mental disabili-
ties receive robust protections.46  Although the criminal system and 
 
 41 See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (applying 
the Due Process Clause to aliens present in the United States). 
 42 Id. at 100. 
 43 According to the Center for Immigration Studies, 13.1 million legal and illegal immi-
grants arrived in the United States in the last ten years.  See Census:  Population Up 27 Mil-
lion in Just 10 Years, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Dec. 2010), http://cis.org/
2010CensusPopulation.  Further, the Pew Research Center estimates that unauthorized 
immigrants who would be subject to deportation proceedings comprise 4% of the coun-
try’s adult population.  JEFFREY S. PASSEL & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR U.S.-BORN CHILDREN 1 (2010), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/125.pdf. 
 44 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). 
 45 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2006). 
 46 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006) (prescribing the process for determining an individual’s 
mental competency to stand trial).  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the civil 
system also includes protections for incompetent persons who are the subject of civil 
suits.  FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c). 
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the civil immigration system are distinct, both systems offer parallel 
due process protections.  The same due process arguments that sup-
port the rights of mentally disabled criminal defendants should apply 
with equal force to mentally disabled detainees.  Thus, a comparison 
between the respective systems helps to frame the argument for 
enacting a right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants. 
There are two levels of protection for criminal defendants based 
on (1) whether they are competent to stand trial, and (2) whether 
they have the capacity to represent themselves a trial. 
The first level of inquiry when a criminal defendant’s mental sta-
tus is at issue examines the defendant’s competence to stand trial.47  
In Pate v. Robinson, the Court explained that “[w]here the evidence 
raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand tri-
al, the judge on his own motion must impanel a jury and conduct a 
sanity hearing.”48  According to the Court in Drope v. Missouri, “evi-
dence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and 
any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all rele-
vant in determining whether further inquiry is required.”49 
The trial court next applies the well accepted Dusky v. United States 
standard for determining competence to stand trial, a standard that 
asks whether the individual has “sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” 
and a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him.”50  Thus, central to a criminal defendant’s case is the 
possession of rational understanding and the ability to engage with 
counsel—either hired or appointed.51 
Since Dusky was a sparsely worded opinion providing minimal 
guidance, state legislatures have added their own criteria to clarify 
the competency evaluation.52  One method often used in practice in-
volves competency checklists that help judges evaluate whether a de-
fendant understands the legal process, consistent with the Dusky 
 
 47 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (observing that it is constitutionally im-
permissible to try a mentally incompetent defendant). 
 48 Id. at 385. 
 49 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). 
 50 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (developing the test to determine an 
individual’s competence to stand trial).  This standard is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).   
 51 See United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998) (including whether 
a defendant is able to consult with counsel as an element of the competence determina-
tion). 
 52 See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 128 (2007) 
(discussing efforts by legislators, courts, and clinicians to add content to the Dusky stan-
dard). 
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standard.53  Regardless of mental health or economic status, all crimi-
nal defendants have a right to counsel.54  A criminal defendant who is 
found competent to stand trial always has access to representation. 
When a criminal defendant is found competent to stand trial, the 
Constitution may nevertheless preclude self-representation to protect 
procedural fairness.  In Massey v. Moore, a suicidal defendant, who 
had been held in a psychiatric facility, was not represented by counsel 
during trial.55  The Court identified this lack of representation as pro-
cedurally unfair and created a distinction between competence to 
stand trial and competence to proceed without counsel during trial.  
The Court explained that “one might not be insane in the sense of 
being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand 
trial without the benefit of counsel.”56  The Court further empha-
sized: 
[I]f he is insane, his need of a lawyer to tender the defense is too plain 
for argument.  We have not allowed convictions to stand if the accused 
stood trial without the benefit of counsel and yet was so unskilled, so ig-
norant, or so mentally deficient as not to be able to comprehend the le-
gal issues involved in his defense.57 
The Court similarly emphasized the need to provide counsel for the 
mentally disabled in Wade v. Mayo: 
There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental 
capacity, are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prose-
cution of a relatively simple nature.  This incapacity is purely personal 
and can be determined only by an examination and observation of the 
individual.  Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint 
counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.58 
Thus, in criminal cases, the Court vehemently opposes self-
representation by the mentally disabled. 
The issue of capacity for self-representation was recently ad-
dressed by the Court in Indiana v. Edwards.59  The Court found that 
the Constitution allows states to place restrictions on an individual’s 
decision to represent himself, even if he has been found competent 
 
 53 See id. at 129–30 (providing an example of a judicial checklist used to assess competency). 
 54 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963) (finding a right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment in all criminal proceedings). 
 55 348 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1954). 
 56 Id. at 108. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948). 
 59 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008). 
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to stand trial.60  Further, the Court noted that the Dusky competence 
standard presumes that an incompetent individual has access to 
counsel with whom he can consult.61  When a mentally disabled indi-
vidual proceeds without counsel, the Edwards Court explained that 
“insofar as a defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper con-
viction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context 
undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, 
providing a fair trial.”62  Thus, the assignment of counsel for an indi-
vidual who lacks capacity promotes fairness and preserves the integri-
ty of the justice system. 
Separate from a competency determination, a capacity determina-
tion focuses on the threat of an “improper conviction.”63  An individ-
ual can only represent himself if he has the ability to waive counsel 
“voluntarily and intelligently.”64  Thus, the standard for voluntary re-
presentation pro se is higher than the Dusky standard for competence 
to stand trial.65  Even if an individual is competent to stand trial, safe-
guards may be necessary to ensure that a defendant recognizes the 
significance of the proceedings and can fairly and intelligently 
represent his interests.66 
In addition to fairness concerns, the Court in Indiana v. Edwards 
invokes individual dignity as a reason to prevent self-representation 
by the mentally disabled.67  Accordingly, for individuals who lack 
 
 60 Id. (“We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic ac-
count of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who 
seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”). 
 61 See id. at 165; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been ac-
cepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to under-
stand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and 
to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”). 
 62 Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176–77. 
 63 Id. at 176. 
 64 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). 
 65 See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 
313, 322–23 (2009) (“[T]he Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the 
particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to 
conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.  That is to say, the Con-
stitution permits [s]tates to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent 
enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the 
point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” (quot-
ing Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177–78)). 
 66 Cf. John T. Broderick, The Choice Is Ours, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2008, at 5, 5–8 (challenging the 
court system to consider whether self-representation can ever be fair and concluding that 
self-representation has a disproportionate impact on the poor). 
 67 See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (“[A] right of self-representation at trial will not ‘affirm the 
dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the 
assistance of counsel.”). 
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mental capacity, “the spectacle that could well result from . . . self-
representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as en-
nobling.”68  Therefore, provisions preventing the mentally disabled 
from representing themselves protect dignitary concerns in addition 
to fair outcomes. 
These rigorous competency standards and limits on self-
representation are absent from the immigration court system.  Efforts 
to safeguard mentally disabled immigrants’ rights should therefore 
draw on the protections offered by this parallel system. 
C.  Comparing the Stakes of Criminal Prosecution and Deportation 
The criminal and immigration systems are characterized as legally 
distinct, yet the functional consequences of the systems are similar.  
The comparative impact of deportation and criminal sanctions calls 
into question the constitutionality of providing criminal defendants 
and detainees different procedural protections.  The Supreme Court 
recognizes that “although deportation technically is not criminal pu-
nishment it may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the depriva-
tion of the right to pursue a vocation or calling.”69  In Ng Fung Ho v. 
White, the Court explained that the law extends Fifth Amendment 
protections to deportation hearings because deportation “may re-
sult . . . in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life 
worth living.”70  While the immigration system is civilly and legally dis-
tinct from the criminal system, the sanctions imposed by both systems 
are similarly severe. 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court addressed whether an attorney is 
legally required to inform a client that a guilty plea would lead to de-
portation.71  The Court described criminal convictions and immigra-
tion penalties as “enmeshed,” because of the impact of a criminal 
conviction on an immigrant’s legal residence in the United States.72  
Although Padilla confronted the consequences of a criminal plea, the 
case reinforces the Court’s views about the gravity of immigration 
sanctions.  Understanding the comparative weight of deportation and 
criminal punishment supports applying the same safeguards used in 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945). 
 70 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
 71 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (determining that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
requires attorneys to inform their clients about the immigration consequences of a crim-
inal conviction). 
 72 See id. at 1481 (“Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is inti-
mately related to the criminal process.”). 
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the criminal system to the immigration system—including the crimi-
nal system’s recognition of the unique concerns confronting the 
mentally disabled. 
D.  Due Process Deprivations for Mentally Disabled Immigrants 
The current system of compelling the mentally disabled to 
represent themselves violates the Due Process Clause by failing to 
provide mentally ill detainees with access to fair procedure. 
In the criminal context, Massey v. Moore raised concerns about an 
individual who was “so unskilled, so ignorant, or so mentally deficient 
as not to be able to comprehend the legal issues involved in his de-
fense.”73  The same critique applies to mentally disabled immigrants, 
like Jose Fernandez Sanchez and Xiu Ping Jiang.  In spite of their sta-
tus as immigrants, Fernandez Sanchez and Jiang still have due 
process rights and face sanctions that could deprive them of “all that 
makes life worth living.”74  If either individual were brought into crim-
inal court, it would be clear under the guidance of Wade v. Mayo that 
because an “incapacity” was present, “the refusal to appoint counsel 
[was] a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”75  To respect due process protections, immigrants should have 
access to a fair hearing.  Requiring mentally disabled immigrants to 
represent themselves undermines these constitutional protections. 
While the Court is still developing a precise definition for due 
process in the right to counsel context, it is clear that due process re-
quires fundamental fairness.76  Fundamental fairness concerns exist 
when there is an absence of “one of the elements deemed essential to 
due process.”77  In Torres-Chavez v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit assessed 
whether a proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien 
[was] prevented from reasonably presenting her case.”78  Thus, fun-
damental fairness concerns protect the presentation of a coherent le-
gal defense in immigration proceedings. 
An increasing number of circuit courts now acknowledge that pre-
serving immigrant due process rights requires fair representation by 
 
 73 Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954). 
 74 Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284. 
 75 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948). 
 76 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (noting that due process has no 
“precise definition” in a case rejecting a right to counsel in parental custody hearings, 
and explaining that due process requires fundamental fairness). 
 77 United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923). 
 78 Torres-Chavez v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hernandez v. Mu-
kasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
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counsel.  In Lin v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a 
denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment if the proceeding 
was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from rea-
sonably presenting his case.”79  The court was willing to find prejudice 
“when the performance of counsel was so inadequate that it may have 
affected the outcome of the proceedings.”80  Similar legal logic ap-
plies when self-representation is “so inadequate” because of the indi-
vidual’s mental deficiency that it prejudices the outcome of a hear-
ing.  Representation by a mentally ill detainee who lacks the capacity 
to present a cogent case should be categorized as unconstitutional, 
inadequate representation. 
Further, in Prichard-Ciriza v. INS, the Fifth Circuit assessed whether 
an immigration judge erred by not appointing counsel for a detainee 
who did not have a mental disability.81  In its analysis, the court as-
sessed whether the absence of counsel demonstrated “prejudice 
which implicates the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.”82  The 
court concluded that Prichard-Ciriza’s lack of counsel did not impli-
cate fundamental fairness because he was repeatedly told of oppor-
tunities to access “free or low-cost” legal aid.83  Even so, the Prichard-
Ciriza fundamental fairness framework raises the question of whether 
self-representation by the mentally disabled prejudices a detainee’s 
case in a way that is fundamentally unfair. 
Going beyond the concerns attached to inadequate representa-
tion by an attorney, some courts have found that the absence of 
counsel for an immigrant may violate the Due Process Clause.  For 
example, in United States v. Torres-Sanchez, the Eighth Circuit stated 
that, “in some circumstances, depriving an alien of the right to coun-
sel may rise to a due process violation.”84  The court explained that 
because the detainee was informed of his statutory right to seek 
counsel, the hearing did not violate the Due Process Clause.85  How-
ever, a mentally ill individual who is informed of his right is unlikely 
to have the capacity to understand the significance of the informa-
tion or the importance of representation.  Thus, safeguards that exist 
 
 79 377 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 80 Id. at 1024 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 978 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that fundamental fairness is a requirement in 
deportation hearings). 
 82 Id. at 222 (quoting Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 83 Id. 
 84 68 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 85 Id. at 231. 
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to protect the rights of mentally sound immigrants are insufficient to 
protect the mentally disabled.86  For this reason, special rules are 
needed to support the mentally disabled and ensure they have access 
to a fair hearing. 
While some courts have concluded that self-representation by a 
mentally sound detainee does not violate fundamental fairness prin-
ciples,87 the analysis must change when applied to a mentally disabled 
detainee.  The purpose of the fundamental fairness doctrine is to de-
termine whether an individual has the opportunity to reasonably 
present his case.  Requiring a delusional or catatonic individual to 
represent himself upends the fundamental fairness doctrine because 
mental deficiency renders a reasonable presentation impossible.  
Thus, the status quo supported by the current immigration system is 
fundamentally unfair. 
E.  Determining What Process Is Due 
Applying a due process balancing test provides further support for 
protecting the rights of mentally disabled immigrants.  The dominant 
standard for determining what process is due was established by the 
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.88  The Eldridge test balances the interest 
of the individual, the risk of erroneous deprivation without proce-
dure, and the government’s interest in avoiding the procedure.89  The 
following analysis examines each of these three considerations in 
turn. 
1.  The Interest of the Individual 
Mentally disabled immigrants have an undeniably critical interest 
in fair representation.  Without representation, there is a high like-
lihood that a disabled immigrant will not understand the charges 
against him and will not have the opportunity to fairly present his 
case.  The immigrant has a profound interest in accessing counsel 
 
 86 The insufficiency of these safeguards implicates the previously discussed logic from Turn-
er v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011).  See discussion supra note 38.  If safeguards do 
not remedy a fundamental fairness violation, then a civil complainant should have a right 
to counsel. 
 87 See, e.g., Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990) (dismissing an alien’s chal-
lenge that the lack of appointed counsel was a valid ground for reversing a deportation 
order). 
 88 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976). 
 89 Id. 
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who can present cogent legal arguments and increase the likelihood 
of a successful asylum claim.90 
2.  The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
Self-representation increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation.  
As previously noted, individuals who do not have access to counsel 
are significantly less likely to succeed in their asylum claims.91  The 
fact that many asylum claims fail because detainees lack information 
about available defenses illustrates the value of adequate representa-
tion.92  Thus, adequate representation protects immigrants against 
wrongful deportation.  The risk of erroneous deprivation is only ex-
acerbated by the existence of cognitive disabilities that obfuscate the 
effectiveness of self-representation. 
Further, appointing counsel protects American citizens from er-
roneous deportation.  Mentally disabled American citizens often 
come in contact with immigration authorities and lack the capacity to 
identify themselves as citizens.  For example, in one case, a severely 
mentally ill woman from Indiana was nearly deported to Russia after 
she told authorities that she was a Russian immigrant.93  Similarly, in 
2008 Mark Lyttle was deported to Mexico after authorities denied his 
asylum claim.94  Lyttle was a United States citizen who suffered from 
bipolar disorder and developmental disorders.95  These examples 
demonstrate that enacting safeguards for the mentally disabled in the 
immigration system would protect the needs of both citizens and 
noncitizens and serve the public interest.  Thus, under the Eldridge 
balancing test, requiring the appointment of counsel as an element 
of an immigrant’s due process rights serves the immigrant’s individu-
al interest in promoting fair procedure and supports the public in-
terest in preventing erroneous deportations. 
 
 90 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of how access to counsel improves the likelihood of pre-
senting successful claims to avoid deportation. 
 91 See Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 31, at 740 (noting the increased likelihood of suc-
cess in immigration proceedings with proper representation). 
 92 See Churgin, supra note 32, at 171 (explaining research that indicates that “few detainees 
had any knowledge of possible defenses to removal”). 
 93 See Ramshaw, supra note 3, at 2. 
 94 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 4 (describing instances of wrongful deporta-
tion of mentally ill United States citizens). 
 95 Id. 
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3.  The Government Interest 
The government’s resource-based argument for not providing 
counsel to mentally ill noncitizens is not sufficiently significant to 
overcome the profound individual interest and the pronounced risk 
of erroneous deprivation.  Admittedly, requiring publicly funded law-
yers for mentally disabled immigrants would create additional public 
expense.  There is also precedent for distributing government re-
sources differently between immigrants and citizens.  In Mathews v. 
Diaz, the Court reasoned that government resources do not need to 
be provided equally to citizens and noncitizens alike.96  In that case, 
the Court denied eligibility for Social Security benefits to a nonciti-
zen, explaining that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over natura-
lization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would 
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”97  The Court also explained 
that the fact that an act of Congress treats aliens and citizens diffe-
rently does not mean that government actions are “invidious.”98  
Therefore, the government can treat immigrants and citizens diffe-
rently without implicating concerns about unjust discrimination. 
However, even though aliens and citizens are legally distinct from 
a resource-based perspective, both groups are entitled to due process 
protections.  An individual’s status as a citizen or noncitizen should 
not degrade the strength of constitutional protections.  In Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services, the Court explained that even if the state 
had a pecuniary interest in not extending the right to counsel to all 
those whose parental rights were at issue, “it is hardly significant 
enough to overcome private interests as important as those here.”99  
The Court therefore rejected the notion that the cost of implement-
ing the right to counsel can subvert constitutional rights.  Since im-
migrants and citizens have equal due process rights, financial con-
cerns should not justify the decision to deny mentally disabled 
immigrants a right to counsel. 
Furthermore, there are resource-based reasons to support the 
right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants.  Unrepresented 
 
 96 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (finding that it was not a due process viola-
tion to create a five-year residency requirement before aliens who were permanent resi-
dents could receive Medicare benefits). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 80. 
 99 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (asserting that the conservation of government resources is not a 
sufficiently important reason to prevent the government from protecting a constitutional 
right, but ultimately deciding that there is not a right to counsel in every parental status 
termination proceeding). 
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mentally disabled immigrants often “languish” in detention facilities 
because judges will not accept pro se admissions of deportability from 
these immigrants.100  In fact, many judges keep these detainees in de-
tention for prolonged periods of time by issuing multiple conti-
nuances.101  These immigration judges may hope that, over time, ad-
ditional evidence will arise to supplement what the mentally disabled 
immigrant is able to communicate.102  While judicial sympathy may 
stall deportation or prevent self-representation for some, providing 
counsel would create a more efficient process for determining eligi-
bility for asylum instead of expending government resources during 
prolonged periods of detention.  This further bolsters the conclusion 
that the individual interests at stake and the threat of erroneous de-
portations outweigh the government’s pecuniary interest.  On bal-
ance, the Eldridge test supports enacting a right to counsel for immi-
grants.103 
IV.  POLICY SUPPORT FOR ADOPTING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE 
MENTALLY DISABLED 
The policy arena provides further support for the constitutional 
argument for enacting a right to counsel for mentally disabled immi-
grants.  Federal regulations, agency actions, and international human 
rights law prove that there is policy-based support for granting men-
 
100 See Am. Bar Ass’n, Due Process for People with Mental Disabilities in Immigration Removal Pro-
ceedings, 33 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 882, 885 (2009) (presenting arguments 
in favor of appointing counsel for mentally disabled immigrants). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 One argument not included in this Part is that enacting a right to counsel for mentally 
disabled immigrants promotes the value of individual freedom.  The Court previously 
recognized the need to appoint counsel outside of the criminal context when an individ-
ual’s freedom is at risk.  In In re Gault, the Court found that in juvenile delinquency hear-
ings, when a child faces the possibility of institutional commitment, the Due Process 
Clause requires that a family that cannot afford representation be informed of its right to 
counsel.  387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).  The Court recognized commitment as a “deprivation of 
liberty. . . . whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’”  Id. at 50.  Thus, the Court disre-
garded civil and criminal labels and supported a right to counsel because of the potential 
impact of the juvenile adjudication on individual freedom.  Id.  The seriousness of the 
consequences of juvenile commitment motivated the Court in its decision.  Id. 
   Since the Supreme Court already recognizes that deportation has significant conse-
quences for individual freedom and because of the Court’s willingness to extend the right 
to counsel outside of the criminal context when individual freedom is at stake, the Due 
Process Clause should extend to protect the right to counsel for mentally disabled immi-
grants.  Without the ability to adequately present a case, current law undermines immi-
grants’ individual freedom and fails to provide them with recourse under the law. 
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tally disabled immigrants fair procedure instead of mandating com-
pulsory self-representation. 
A.  The Immigration System Already Recognizes the Unique Needs of the 
Mentally Disabled 
Federal regulations provide protections for mentally incompetent 
individuals who cannot appear at trial and prevent immigration 
judges from accepting admissions of deportability from unrepre-
sented respondents who are incompetent.  Under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(b)(3), “[i]f it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental 
incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the At-
torney General shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and 
privileges of the alien.”104  Thus, Congress recognizes the unique 
needs of mentally disabled immigrants.  This is not a new develop-
ment, but part of a long legislative history of protecting the needs of 
mentally challenged immigrants.105  Further, under 8 C.F.R. 
1240.48(b) “[t]he immigration judge shall not accept an admission of 
deportability from an unrepresented respondent who is incompe-
tent.”106  This regulation demonstrates that the immigration system is 
already set up to be responsive to the unique needs of mentally im-
paired immigrants.  A logical extension of the policy that motivates 
these protections supports enacting safeguards against compelling 
mentally disabled immigrants to represent themselves in immigration 
court. 
B.  Recent Policy Developments Support Enacting Safeguards for Mentally 
Disabled Immigrants 
Further, although the immigration system has traditionally re-
jected the right to counsel, there are signs that policymakers are be-
ginning to recognize the importance of effective assistance.  This 
change may have implications for self-representation by the mentally 
disabled.  Attorney General Holder’s recent decision to vacate In re 
 
104 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006); see also Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 
1055 (C.D. Cal 2010) (relying on § 1229a(b)(3) to conclude that reasonable accommoda-
tions for mentally disabled immigrants include the right to counsel). 
105 See A Brief History of Those Provisions in the Act and Regulations Addressing Respondents with 
Mental Health Issues,  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/
tools/MHI/history.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (describing the enactment of safe-
guards for incompetent immigrants from 1952 until the present). 
106 8 C.F.R. § 1240.48(b) (2004). 
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Compean signals a possible sea change for immigration proceedings.107  
In Compean, former Attorney General Mukasey issued an order stating 
that there was no right to effective assistance of counsel for immi-
grants because there was no right to counsel for immigrants.108  In 
addition to vacating the decision, Attorney General Holder decided 
to initiate a rulemaking process to evaluate the framework for deter-
mining whether an immigrant was prejudiced by the action or inac-
tion of counsel.109  This demonstrates additional support for ensuring 
that immigrants have effective representation.  The recognition that 
immigrants may have a right to effective assistance contrasts with the 
incontrovertible fact that self-representation by mentally disabled 
immigrants is ineffective. 
Finally, the EOIR itself acknowledges that no formal guidelines 
exist for recognizing mental health concerns during removal pro-
ceedings and that judges need more guidance for how to fairly treat 
mentally disabled detainees.110  ICE is currently considering the ab-
sence of standards to assess detainee competence.111  This suggests 
additional policy support for reforms to more effectively protect the 
mental health needs of detainees. 
C.  Human Rights Law Support for the Right to Counsel 
Policymakers look to international law as a framework for under-
standing international standards of procedural fairness.  While inter-
national law does not impose positive obligations on the United 
States, it does provide guidance for how to treat noncitizens with dig-
 
107 In re Compean, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. June 3, 2009) (dismissing Attorney General Muka-
sey’s earlier conclusion that, in removal proceedings, there is no constitutional guarantee 
to effective assistance of counsel). 
108 In re Compean, 24 I&N Dec. 710, 714 (A.G. Jan. 7, 2009) (concluding that an immigrant 
does not have a right to challenge the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the deci-
sion to reopen a proceeding based on ineffective assistance is a matter of discretion for 
the Board of Immigration Appeals). 
109 In re Compean, 25 I&N Dec. at 2 (directing “the Acting Director of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review to initiate rulemaking procedures as soon as practicable to evaluate 
the Lozada framework,” thereby allowing the Department of Justice to publish a final rule 
with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings). 
110 See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 52 (noting that, in response to a letter to Attorney 
General Holder in which more than seventy mental health and immigration advocacy or-
ganizations submitted recommendations for reforms to the immigration court system, the 
EOIR explained that it was “presently focusing on providing training to all appropriate 
EOIR legal staff on mental health issues in removal proceedings”). 
111 See Bernstein, supra note 1, at A21 (explaining that Secretary of Homeland Security Janet 
Napolitano is conducting a review of immigration practices and that, according to a 
spokesman, “ICE recognizes the need to address mental health issues among its detai-
nees”). 
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nity and procedural fairness.112  International human rights law pro-
vides additional support for enacting safeguards to protect mentally 
disabled immigrants.  In 1977, the United States signed the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which states:  “Every person has the 
right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, 
by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously es-
tablished by law . . . for the determination of his rights and obliga-
tions of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”113 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has inter-
preted the meaning of the due process protections of the American 
Convention on Human Rights broadly to include the right to be 
represented by counsel.114  Additionally, in 2006 the United States 
signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.115  
Although the Convention was never ratified, it requires that nations 
“ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities.”116  This 
includes “appropriate measures to provide access by persons with dis-
abilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal ca-
pacity.”117  Finally, general United Nations principles for detained 
noncitizens require immigrants to have access to counsel when they 
cannot afford representation.118  Thus, international human rights law 
provides additional persuasive support for creating a right to counsel 
for mentally disabled immigrants. 
 
112 See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 1993:  The 
Challenge of Protection, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY:  A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACH 56–57 (Karen Musalo et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011) (providing background infor-
mation about the protections that international human rights law offers refugees). 
113 American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”) art. 8, Nov. 22, 
1969, T.S. No. 36, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html. 
114 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 41 (discussing the Commission’s analysis that 
the American Convention on Human Rights commands a sufficiently broad construal of 
due process guarantees for individuals facing deportation). 
115 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
116 Id. at art. 13. 
117 Id. at art. 12. 
118 See Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, U.N. Doc. A/43/173, Annex (Dec. 9, 1988) (“If a detained person does 
not have a legal counsel of his own choice, he shall be entitled to have a legal counsel as-
signed to him by a judicial or other authority in all cases where the interests of justice so 
require and without payment by him if he does not have sufficient means to pay.”). 
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING IMMIGRANT DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS 
To ensure that the immigration system respects the constitutional 
rights of mentally disabled immigrants, this Part presents numerous 
recommendations to improve the experience of mentally disabled 
immigrants during immigration proceedings.119 
A.  Develop Reliable Screening Techniques to Recognize Mental Disabilities 
Identifying mental disabilities prior to court proceedings will en-
sure that immigrants receive appropriate mental health care and pre-
vent guesswork in the courtroom.  Judges often lack the training ne-
cessary to identify mental disabilities.  Further, an individual’s 
courtroom behavior may not clearly reveal his need for mental health 
precautions.  This illustrates the importance of appropriate mental 
health screening for all detainees.  Currently, ICE does not have uni-
form standards, and this piecemeal approach impedes identification 
of mental health problems.120  ICE should ensure that mental health 
professionals perform screenings consistently and frequently.  Once a 
mental disability is identified, ICE officials should inform the immi-
gration court.  Consistent identification and coordination will allow 
the immigration court to assess the detainee’s competency and capac-
ity during a hearing. 
Furthermore, immigration judges and the EOIR staff should be 
given additional training in identifying mental disabilities.  If an im-
migrant’s mental health is in question, the judge should make sure 
that the immigrant receives appropriate mental health care instead of 
continuing with the immigration proceedings. 
 
119 Many of these recommendations draw on suggestions promoted by other commentators.  
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 83 (advising, among others, the Assistant Sec-
retary of ICE to continue “exercising favorable prosecutorial discretion in cases where it 
appears the non-citizen has a mental disability” that hinders her ability to present or pre-
vail in court); TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 7 (suggesting the United States De-
partment of Justice undertake procedural reforms to establish consistency in immigration 
court and thereby ensure the fair treatment of mentally disabled immigrants facing de-
portation). 
120 See Detention and Removal:  Immigration Detainee Medical Care:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
supra note 25, at 5–6 (explaining the variation in standards applied by ICE staff for assess-
ing and treating detainee mental health). 
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B.  Develop Clear Standards for Assessing Competency to Stand Trial and 
Capacity for Self-Representation 
1.  Competency Standards 
There are no uniform standards by which an immigration judge 
can determine if a person is competent to stand trial or has the ca-
pacity to represent himself.  This is true even though an immigration 
judge cannot accept an admission of deportability from an incompe-
tent individual.121  Using the criminal Dusky standard as a guide, the 
EOIR should adopt new regulations to clarify the test for competence 
in immigration court.  Guidance will ensure that immigration judges 
apply standards consistently, instead of speculating about how best to 
evaluate competency.  One option, similar to the approach adopted 
by many state legislatures in the criminal law context, is to give immi-
gration judges formal checklists and other clear standards to apply. 
2.  Capacity Evaluation 
Once an individual’s capacity to represent himself is at issue, a ca-
pacity hearing should be held to determine whether he has the ability 
to represent himself.  The criminal standard could be applied 
through regulations that analyze whether the individual decides to 
represent himself “voluntarily and intelligently.”122  Additionally, the 
court should assess whether, considering the individual’s mental abil-
ities, allowing self-representation would increase the chance of a 
wrongful conviction.123  This assessment could be conducted through 
specialized mental health dockets with training for judges in recog-
nizing psychological and developmental disabilities.  Given that a 
large proportion of detainees suffer from mental disabilities, an effi-
cient system for recognizing capacity issues will facilitate the EOIR’s 
work. 
 
121 8 C.F.R. § 1240.48(b) (2006) (“The immigration judge shall not accept an admission of 
deportability from an unrepresented respondent who is incompetent.”). 
122 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding that a state criminal defendant 
may waive his right to counsel if he does so voluntarily and intelligently). 
123 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (describing the risk that self-
representation by an individual with a mental disability will result in an improper sen-
tence). 
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C.  Appoint Counsel for Immigrants with Mental Disabilities 
Congress should amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to 
require the appointment of counsel for mentally disabled immigrants 
who do not have the capacity to represent themselves.  Congress 
should also appropriate the necessary funds to support this provi-
sion.124 
After a capacity hearing, immigration judges should have the au-
thority to appoint counsel.  To clarify the procedure for appointing 
counsel, the EOIR can develop regulations to guide immigration 
courts. 
To ensure the availability of appointed counsel, the EOIR should 
coordinate closely with the American Bar Association and other 
community organizations.  The purpose of this coordination is to de-
velop relationships with immigration lawyers who will be responsible 
for representing mentally disabled detainees.125  Establishing a right 
to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants will advance the goals of 
fairness, protect American citizens, and uphold the basic tenets of 
constitutional due process. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The December 2010 district court decision recognizing that two 
mentally disabled immigrants had a right to counsel was the first of its 
kind.126  And while this view may still be far from the mainstream, le-
gal and policy support for creating a right to counsel for mentally 
disabled detainees continues to grow.  Under the Due Process Clause, 
immigrants like Xiu Ping Jiang and Jose Fernandez Sanchez are 
 
124 The Court has been unwilling to create a civil right to counsel.  See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28, 31–32 (1981) (holding that there is no categorical right to 
counsel in parental termination hearings, but noting that cost considerations should not 
motivate the decision whether to fund representation when it is constitutionally re-
quired).  However, Congress should recognize that immigrants receive due process pro-
tections; the consequences of immigration can be tantamount to a criminal conviction; 
the mentally vulnerable need unique protections; and the current system jeopardizes the 
rights of American citizens.  See discussion supra Parts III–IV. 
125 Ninety-three community leaders signed a letter to Attorney General Holder supporting 
the creation of safeguards for mentally disabled detainees, including new regulations that 
require the appointment of counsel for individuals with mental disabilities facing removal 
proceedings.  Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 100, at 882, 897–900. 
126 See Immigrants Win Right to Representation, ACLU OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES, 
http://www.aclusandiego.org/news_item.php?article_id=001096 (last visited Oct. 28, 
2011) (detailing Judge Gee’s decision to require “the government to provide representa-
tion for any individual in immigration proceedings”). 
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guaranteed the right to a fair trial.127  In the criminal system, the 
Court supports appointing counsel for criminal defendants who lack 
the capacity to represent themselves, and the Court has consistently 
expressed its view that criminal penalties and deportation impose si-
milarly severe sanctions.128  Thus, equivalent due process safeguards 
should apply to mentally disabled criminal defendants and mentally 
disabled immigrants.  Congress and the immigration court system al-
ready recognize the unique needs of mentally ill immigrants,129 and 
recognizing the need for court-appointed representation is just 
another logical step to protect this vulnerable population. 
Further, efficiency arguments support appointing counsel to save 
the government the expense of prolonged detention.  There is also a 
strong governmental interest in preventing the erroneous deporta-
tion of American citizens.130  Ultimately, it is fundamentally unfair to 
require immigrants who are so catatonic that they cannot fairly 
present their case to be responsible for their own defense when what 
is at stake is “all that makes life worth living.”131 
The country remains polarized about immigration reform, but the 
right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants would not be a 
guarantee of asylum.  In fact, imposing the right to counsel protects 
rather than expands existing constitutional safeguards because it is 
already settled law that immigrants should receive basic due process 
rights.  Forcing the mentally disabled to represent themselves renders 
these constitutional protections meaningless, and action should be 
taken to ensure that the mentally disabled do not face deportation 
without representation. 
 
 
127 See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding 
that, before deportation, aliens are entitled to receive a fair hearing as required by the 
Due Process Clause). 
128 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (suggesting that deportation, though not 
criminal punishment, “may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the 
right to pursue a vocation or a calling”). 
129 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006) (“If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental 
incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall 
prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.”); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.48(b) (2006) (directing an immigration judge to direct a hearing on deportability 
issues when an unrepresented respondent is not competent to offer an admission of de-
portability). 
130 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 4 (explaining that mentally disabled Ameri-
can citizens have been mistakenly deported because they could not accurately represent 
their citizenship status). 
131 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
